Economist Online

In a presentation to this year’s annual meeting of the American Economic Association, Alan Blinder argues that the circumstances—low inflation and low nominal interest rates, persistent excess capacity, and fiscal policy paralyzed by large debts—that have forced central banks to operate through unconventional policy will be a recurring feature of the economic landscape. “We can’t stuff the crazy aunt back in the closet”.

According to Economist Magazine, of the rich world’s four major central banks, Britain’s and Japan’s already have their policy rates stuck near zero and the fourth, the European Central Bank (ECB), is likely to get there this year. Meanwhile, the balance-sheets of all four institutions have ballooned as they expand the volume and range of assets and loans they hold (see charts below).

Whatever central bankers do, they cannot repair problems best fixed by politicians, such as America’s incoherent fiscal policy or Europe’s fractured institutions. Asked about the ECB’s aggressive new lending to banks, Masaaki Shirakawa, the governor of the Bank of Japan, said it could “buy time”. But he warned it could backfire if politicians fritter away whatever time the central bank has bought. Unfortunately, that risk is never low.

Part 1

 

Part 2

 

Interview of Chicago Fed’s president Charles Evans, one of the vocal doves on the Fed’s Open Market Committee (or FOMC).  Evans advocates the Fed should target on employment growth, and consider raising inflation target to 3%, instead of 2%.

He favors the Fed clearly states its future course of actions and offers clear forward guidance contingent on economic outlook. He cited a piece by Mike Woodford on FT, who made the following forceful argument:

…Mr Bernanke can and should use his speech today to explain how his policy intentions are conditional upon future developments.

A clarification could help the economy in two ways. First, he could signal that a temporary increase in inflation will be allowed, before policy tightening is warranted. This would stimulate spending by lowering real interest rates. Second, specifying the size of any permanent price-level increase would avoid an increase in uncertainty about the long-run price level. This in turn would ward off an increase in inflation risk premiums that might otherwise counteract the desirable effect of the increase in near-term inflation expectations.

Uncertainty about the economic outlook is likely now the most important obstacle to a more robust recovery. The problem is not just uncertainty about Fed policy, but the fact that the Fed has become harder to “read” does not help. Better Fed communication, long on the agenda, would be particularly helpful at this juncture. Jackson Hole provides Mr Bernanke with the ideal opportunity.

 

My problem with Woodford’s recommendation is, how can the Fed convince people that the raise of inflation target is going to be temporary?  What if employment situation won’t get any better after raising inflation target to 3%?  Will 4% then be tolerable?  Will this generate a positive spiral of inflation (expectations)??

Roach questions the Fed’s monetary policy channel through wealth effect, which is prone to generate asset bubbles one after another.  He also thinks the Fed should change its narrow policy objective of price stability, but to ensure broader financial stability.

Interview of Marc Faber, who thinks QE3 is a matter of time.